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PENNSYLVANIA'S ANTITAKEOVER STATUTE:





In July 1989, the Belzberg brothers' acquired 9.85 percent of the
common shares of Armstrong World Industries, Inc., a Pennsylvania-
based manufacturer of floor coverings and building products.2 The
Belzbergs then announced potential plans to acquire control of Arm-
strong via a tender offer.3 Armstrong Chairman William Adams re-
sponded that Armstrong was not for sale, and began lobbying state
legislators for additional legislative ammunition to fend off the
Belzbergs. 4 Pennsylvania's Act 36 of 19905 was introduced on October
20, 1989,6 in response to the Belzbergs' potential takeover bid for Arm-
strong. The Pennsylvania General Assembly overwhelmingly enacted
Act 36, the nation's toughest antitakeover statute on April 27, 1990.7
The collapse of the junk bond8 market in late 1989, as well as the
I would like to thank Professor Marc Grinker of the Chicago-Kent College of Law, whose
insight and comments were invaluable in preparing this Note. This Note is much improved because
of Professor Grinker's efforts. Finally, I am most grateful to Andrea, Katy, and Kerry for their
enduring patience and understanding while I worked on this Note.
1. The three Belzberg brothers became well known in the 1980s as "greenmailers"-those
who buy a minority position in a company vulnerable to takeover, hoping to persuade frightened
management or another corporate raider to buy them out at a profit. The Belzberg brothers were
visible participants in T. Boone Pickens' raid on Gulf Oil in the early 1980s. Fin. Times, Sept. 12,
1990, section I at 29. Greenmailers have no interest in furthering the interests of either shareholders
or the national economy. The greenmailer's purpose is only to profit from management's
vulnerability.
2. Armstrong employs 6,800 people in Pennsylvania and 28,000 worldwide. 21 SEC. REG.
LAW RFT. 1223 (1989).
3. Wall St. J., Jul. 6, 1989 at 1, col. 4.
4. N.Y.L.J., Sept. 10, 1990, at 5.
5. Act of April 27, 1990, No. 36, 1990 Pa. Laws 36, 15 PA. CONS. STAT. AN. § § 102, 511-
12, 1721, 2502, 2542, 2561-67, 2571-76, 2581-83, and 2585-88 (Purdon Supp. 1991) [hereinafter Act
of April 27, 1990].
6. Act of April 27, 1990, supra note 5.
7. The Act was approved by a margin of 183-17 in the Pennsylvania House and 43-6 in the
Senate. N.Y.L.J., Sept. 10, 1990, at 7. Act 36 has control-share provisions fairly representative of
state antitakeover statutes. However, certain provisions of Act 36 have appreciably toughened Penn-
sylvania's stance toward hostile takeovers. See infra notes 141-214 and accompanying text.
8. "Junk bonds" are bonds rated below "investment grade" by the two principal bond rating
agencies (Moody's or Standard and Poor's). Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers The Strain in
the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 4 (1986).
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reluctance of commercial banks to participate in highly leveraged deals,
dimmed the Belzbergs' prospects of financing a hostile takeover via a
tender offer.9 The Belzbergs continued to press Armstrong with a
threatened proxy fight, seeking a change in the company's corporate
charter, and representation on the board of directors.' 0 The enactment
of Act 36 forced the Belzbergs' hand, resulting in a complete liquidation
of their 11.7 percent stake in Armstrong, reportedly at a gross loss of $17
million. I
Third-generation 12 antitakeover legislation such as Act 36 has pro-
liferated since the Supreme Court upheld the Indiana Control Share Ac-
quisition Statute 13 in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America.'4 Act 36
has control-share provisions' 5 that are very similar to the Indiana statute
upheld in CTS. However, certain other provisions of Act 36, particularly
the disgorgement provisions,' 6 make it the toughest antitakeover statute
yet adopted in any state.' 7 For this reason, the Pennsylvania statute de-
9. Wall St. J., Dec. 4, 1990 at Cl. Citibank initially showed some interest in financing a
Belzberg takeover of Armstrong, but later backed off. Flack, The Belzberg Brats, FORBES, Nov. 13,
1989 p. 41.
10. The Belzbergs were successful at electing one director, Professor Michael Jensen of
Harvard Business School, to one of the four vacant seats on Armstrong's board. 9 EXEC. Rvr. p. 22.
11. N.Y. Times, May 31, 1990, Section D, at 5, col. 3. The reported loss of $17 million did not
include a subsequent settlement reached between Armstrong and First City Financial, the Belzbergs'
financing arm. Under the terms of the settlement, Armstrong paid First City $4.4 million as stated
consideration for the Belzbergs' proxy expenses and settlement of all outstanding litigation. Chicago
Tribune, June 7, 1990 (Business), at 1. Armstrong shareholders presented constitutional challenges
to Act 36 in the federal courts. The Third Circuit recently ruled that the case was not ripe for review
since Armstrong was no longer subject to a takeover attempt. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v.
Adams, No. 91-1503, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6473 (3d Cir. Apr. 10, 1992).
12. Statutes enacted after the Supreme Court's decision in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987) are commonly referred to as third-generation statutes. Statutes enacted
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) are commonly
referred to as first-generation statutes. Statutes enacted after MITE and before CTS are commonly
referred to as second-generation statutes.
13. IND. CODE ANN. Sections 23-1-42 (Bums Cum. Supp. 1986). The control-share statute at
issue in CTS provided that a person who attained certain threshold limits of share ownership could
not vote those shares unless voting rights were affirmatively granted by a majority of the corpora-
tion's "disinterested" shareholders. Id. Section 23-1-42-4(a)(3). See infra notes 114-40 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in CTS.
14. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
15. Act of April 27, 1990 §§ 2561-67, supra note 5.
16. The Act's disgorgement provisions provide that anyone who acquires 20% or more of the
voting power in a covered Pennsylvania corporation must disgorge, or forfeit, any profits on subse-
quent sales of the stock. Id. §§ 2571-75.
17. Third generation antitakeover legislation has been adopted in various forms in the different
states. Excluding the Pennsylvania statute, there are four types of regulation. First, there are the
fair price statutes that require the acquiring person to pay the "best price" to all shareholders within
a certain statutory period. See, e.g., MD. CORPS. & ASSNS. CODE ANN. § 3-601-604 (1991 Cum.
Supp.). Second, there are business combination, or "freeze" statutes that permit a tender offer to
proceed without delay, but delay any subsequent unapproved merger for three to five years. See,
e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1991). Third, there are the control share statutes that condition
the acquiring person's voting rights upon approval of the disinterested shareholders. See, e.g., IND.
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serves special scrutiny, as it may serve as a model for other states to
fortify their own antitakeover legislation.
This Note begins with an examination of the policy arguments for
and against antitakeover legislation.1 8 It then, in Part III, gives a brief
history of the development of antitakeover legislation. 19 Part IV focuses
on the purposes and specific provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.20 In
Part V, this Note presents a constitutional analysis, 2' concluding that the
Pennsylvania statute is constitutionally flawed as an impermissible regu-
lation of the interstate market for corporate control.
22
II. THE POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST ANTITAKEOVER
LEGISLATION
The debate about antitakeover legislation intensified during the
1980s because of the success of financial entrepreneurs in arbitraging the
difference between stock and asset values of public companies. For ex-
ample, in the RJR Nabisco takeover, the company's stock price was trad-
ing in the $40-$50 range prior to the takeover. However, the underlying
value of the assets was worth much more than $40-$50, which ultimately
led to the takeover of RJR. As was true in the RJR takeover, this arbi-
traging was often accomplished by means of a "bust-up" takeover-ac-
quiring control and then liquidating certain of the target corporation's
business operations in order to service acquisition indebtedness.23
These "bust-up" takeovers have served as the starting point in the
debate about state regulation of takeovers. Certain commentators con-
tend that "bust-up" takeovers, as well as corporate restructurings under-
CODE ANN. § 23-1-42 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1986). The final general approach has been to grant
dissenters the right to cash out. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT ANN. tit. 13-A, § 909 (1964). For a
general description of the various approaches and which statutes have been adopted by the various
states, see T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 581-593 (2d ed. 1990). Penn-
sylvania's antitakeover statute is far tougher than any other state's approach, because the statute not
only contains the control share provisions, but has also adopted disgorgement provisions, severance
compensation provisions, labor contract continuation provisions, and provisions which have ex-
panded the factors which a target corporation's directors may consider in evaluating a potential
takeover. See infra notes 141-214 and accompanying text for a full description of the specific provi-
sions of the Pennsylvania statute.
18. See infra notes 23-66 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 67-140 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 141-214 and accompanying text.
21. This Note examines the Pennsylvania statute under the Supremacy Clause and Commerce
Clause issues presented in CIS. The Pennsylvania statute also presents the issue, particularly with
respect to the Act's disgorgement provisions, of whether these provisions work an uncompensated
taking in contravention of the Fifth Amendment. That issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
22. See infra notes 215-61 and accompanying text.
23. Coffee, supra note 8, at 3. The increased incidence of "bust-up" takeovers is due in no small
part to the explosive growth of the junk bond market in the mid and late 1980s. Id. at 4.
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taken as a result of threatened hostile takeovers, 24 have brought negative
economic and social costs upon stakeholders25 of the target company,
including: layoffs, losses to customers and suppliers of the corporation,
and loss of tax revenues to the community. 26 Other commentators reply
that investors have prospered as a result of the growth in takeover
activity.
27
Both investors and stakeholders would like to promote policies that
further each group's perceived self-interest. Investors, of course, would
prefer policies that foster the growth of corporate profits,28 including the
opportunity to receive a control premium in a successful tender offer.
Control premium presents investors in a cash tender offer an opportunity
to sell their shares at a premium over the pre-existing market price. 29
Stakeholders, on the other hand, would prefer policies that minimize the
burden of negative economic and social costs upon in-state interests.
30
Thus, the difference of opinion between these two groups lies in the fact
that they would prefer to pursue different policies in the regulation of
takeover activity in order to maximize the wealth of their constituencies.
As a result of these differing views, each group has promoted take-
over regulation policies at opposite ends of the regulatory spectrum.
Those who oppose any antitakeover legislation maintain that state corpo-
rate governance law simply cannot interfere with the directors' duty to
maximize investment return to investors .3  Those who support antitake-
24. Between January 1984 and mid-July 1985, 398 of North America's 850 largest corporations
underwent corporate restructurings. Id. at 6.
25. "Stakeholders" are the employees, suppliers, customers and communities which have a
"stake" in the corporation. Comment, A Framework for Satisfying Corporate Directors' Responsibili-
ties Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes" The Use of Explicit Contract, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1451, 1452 (1990). [hereinafter Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes].
26. Id. at 1461. This comment mentions that the increased use of state antitakeover legislation
is due to a fear on the part of state legislatures that the economic and social costs of a bust-up
takeover fall disproportionately on the state with substantial connections to the target corporation.
Id.
27. Professor Michael Jensen of Harvard Business School estimates that transactions in the
market for corporate control unlocked shareholder gains of $500 billion between 1977 and 1988-
more than 50% of the cash dividends paid by the entire corporate sector over the same period.
Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. Bus. REV. 61, 65 (Sept.- Oct. 1989).
28. "Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the
acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for
their stockholders as possible." M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1982), quoted
from Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, supra note 25, at 1451.
29. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161 (1981).
30. Coffee, supra note 8, at 10.
31. Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel maintain that a rule requiring managerial passiv-
ity to any premium tender offer is necessary in order to maximize shareholder welfare. In other
words, any resistance by a corporation's managers to any premium tender offer ultimately results in
decreasing shareholder wealth. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 29, at 1201. Easterbrook and
Fischel note that their argument is founded upon the premise that tender offers increase social wel-
[Vol. 66:863866
REGULATION OF INTERSTATE MARKET
over legislation reply that takeovers cannot simply be viewed as private
ordering between the corporation and the shareholder, but must more
realistically be viewed as a public law problem-that of preventing the
stakeholder from disproportionately shouldering the burden of the exter-
nalities3 2 associated with takeovers.
33
Both of these views are artificially narrow. The supporters of an-
titakeover legislation focus only on in-state stakeholder interests, to the
exclusion of national stakeholder interests. Those opposed to antitake-
over legislation focus only upon investor interests, to the exclusion of the
overall interests of the national economy. It is the contention of this
Note that a proper analysis should focus on the broader national interests
involved-that of the interstate market for corporate control (Le., the
interests of the national economy). Each of these three positions will be
evaluated in turn, concluding that a proper analysis of the merits of an-
titakeover legislation must begin by focusing upon the broader national
interests involved.
A. Opposition to State Antitakeover Regulation: The Case for the
Investor's Right to Maximize Investment Return
Certain commentators opposed to state antitakeover legislation have
reasoned that if tender offers benefit investors, the directors of the corpo-
ration, as part of their duty to maximize investment return, must em-
brace any premium tender offers.34 In fact, these commentators maintain
that investors possess an absolute right to control premium.3 5 Based on
the premise that investors have an absolute right to control premium,
these commentators propose a rule "severely limiting the ability of man-
agers to resist a tender offer even if the purpose of the resistance is to
fare by moving productive assets to higher valued uses. Id. at 1182. They argue that since tender
offers move productive assets to higher valued uses, then investors should be protected from manage-
rial resistance to a premium tender offer. In contrast, it is the premise of this Note that since the
purpose of state antitakeover legislation is to prevent assets from moving to higher valued uses, the
interstate market for corporate control (synonymous with the interests of the national economy)
must be protected by the dormant Commerce Clause from this discriminatory legislation. See infra
notes 234-61 and accompanying text.
32. "Externalities" are costs imposed on others not reflected in the market price of the goods
produced. Ogus, Property Rights and Freedom of Economic Activity, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
RIGHTS 127-28 (Henkin & Rosenthal ed. 1990). Ogus contends that even systems committed to free
alienation of property rights recognize certain instances when such rights must be regulated because
pursuit of social welfare is impeded by market failure as a result of externalities. Id. In the context
of hostile takeovers, those supporting state regulation of hostile takeovers contend that cities decay
and workers are left unemployed after industry leaves, and that the in-state interests are left to clean
up the problems. See generally, Coffee, supra note 8.
33. Id. at 8-10.




trigger a bidding contest."' 36 Under this rule, erection of any obstacles to
takeovers---either urging adoption of antitakeover statutes or charter
amendments 37-would be prohibited.
38
Tender offers benefit investors in at least three ways. First, tender
offers result in substantial control premium for investors. Indeed, SEC
studies show that investors received average control premium varying
from 63.4 percent in "any and all" 39 tender offers to 31.3 percent in par-
tial tender offers. 4"
Second, an unfettered market for corporate control benefits inves-
tors by ensuring that assets freely flow through state borders to achieve
their highest economic utility. For example, assume Oil Company A, a
public company incorporated in the state of Pennsylvania, is an inept
company whose main accomplishment is drilling dry holes. Both the
national economy and investors would benefit if Exxon were allowed to
acquire Oil Company A and put its assets to more productive uses.
However, parochial state antitakeover legislation whose main purpose is
to keep corporate assets located in-state prevents such a relocation of
corporate assets. State antitakeover legislation, by hindering a free mar-
ket for corporate control, prevents investors from realizing the fullest
potential value of their investment.
41
Third, the threat of a hostile takeover serves as a useful protection
for investors against inefficient management. Thus, the threat of hostile
takeover polices incumbent management whether or not a tender offer
occurs. 42 The mere threat of a hostile offer forces management to con-
centrate on its primary duty-to maximize investor wealth--or risk be-
ing replaced. 43 Champions of a free market for corporate control, such
as SEC Chairman Breeden 44 and former SEC Chairman Ruder45 have
36. Id. at 1162.
37. For example, one common charter amendment is the "poison pill." Poison pills enable
shareholders to receive additional shares of securities at bargain prices when a bidder acquires a
specified percentage of a target company's stock. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794
F.2d 250, 254-55 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
38. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 29, at 1201.
39. In an "any and all" tender offer, the offeror specifies that any shares tendered will be cashed
out for a specific price. SEC, The Economics of Partial and Two-Tier Tender Offers, 49 Fed. Reg.
26,755 (1984).
40. Blended average control premium in two-tier tender offers was 55.1 percent. Id.
41. Dynamics, 794 F.2d 250.
42. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 29, at 1169.
43. Id.
44. SEC Chairman Breeden has said that the new Pennsylvania statute will disenfranchise
shareholders and leave incompetent managers free to run a company into the ground. Fin. Times,
Oct. 18, 1990, at 34.
45. Former SEC Chairman Ruder has said:
Limitations on the free transferability of securities of corporations which are owned by
[Vol. 66:863
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argued that antitakeover statutes, by removing this built-in check against
inefficient management, constitute a clear disenfranchisement of share-
holders' rights.
Thus, corporate combinations do offer three major benefits to inves-
tors: control premium; allowing corporate assets to freely flow to their
highest valued use; and preventing shareholder disenfranchisement. Be-
cause these three benefits are available to shareholders, some commenta-
tors reason that directors, as part of their duty to maximize the investor's
investment return, simply cannot permit any resistance to a takeover at-
tempt."6 The major weakness in this rule of passivity is that management
can take measures to maximize shareholder value that the market will
not take unless management signals: its opposition to the first offer; the
price that management is willing to sell the company for; and, its willing-
ness to take steps to bottle up the first offer so there is enough time for a
"white knight"-a bidder favorable to management-to step in and
make a bid for the company at a price which management considers
fair.4 7 In addition, certain pre-existing defenses (i.e., fair-price poison
pills) result in greater shareholder wealth by preventing a low-ball offer
from being made.48 Finally, because some offers are meant to fail, man-
agement should have some discretion to discourage such offers.
49
shareholders nationwide diminish the efficiency, depth and liquidity of the nation's securi-
ties markets. Accordingly, I believe that federal law should control in that area by pre-
empting state statutes that unduly interfere with the free transferability of securities. I
believe that corporations whose activities and ownership are national in scope should not
be given protection against takeovers by the states where their primary production facilities
are located. Just as I believe it to be imprudent for Congress to regulate internal corporate
affairs through tender offer regulation, I believe it is imprudent for the states to use their
authority over matters of internal governance as a means of regulating the interstate mar-
ket for corporate control.
"Federal Preemption of State Anti-takeover legislation," before the 26th Annual Corporate Counsel
Institute (Chicago, Oct. 7, 1987) (remarks of David S. Ruder, SEC Chairman), quoted in Steinberg,
Federal Preemption of State Anti-takeover Statute" The Time for Congressional Action Is Now, 16
SEc. REG. L.J. 80 (1988).
46. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 29.
47. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). For exam-
ple, in Revlon, Revlon's management clearly indicated its opposition to Pantry Pride's initial hostile
offer of $47.50 per common share, after being advised by the company's investment bankers that the
company's value was in the "mid 50" dollar range. Id. at 177. Revlon management indicated a
price it would be willing to sell at by adopting a poison pill which would cash out Revlon sharehold-
ers at $65 per share. Id. Finally, Revlon management took steps to bottle up the Pantry Pride offer,
by adopting a poison pill and a stock repurchase plan. Id. Management's efforts did result in in-
creasing shareholder value, when Pantry Pride ended up acquiring Revlon at $58 per share.
48. For example, in Revlon, if Revlon had a fair-price poison pill in place prior to the Pantry
Pride offer, Pantry Pride's initial offer would undoubtedly have been higher than the initial $47.50
low-ball offer.
49. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). In Unocal, Mesa's
offer for Unocal was never meant to succeed. The offer was an attempt by Mesa (controlled by T.
Boone Pickens) to "greenmail" Unocal. "Greenmail" refers to the practice of buying out a corpo-
rate raider's stock at a premium in order to prevent a takeover. Id. at 956 n.13.
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B. The Antitakeover Position
Those who support antitakeover legislation argue that directors,
when evaluating a tender offer, have a duty to consider stakeholder inter-
ests.50 Accordingly, regulation of the takeover process, through state an-
titakeover legislation, is necessary to prevent stakeholders from
disproportionately assuming the consequences of the externalities associ-
ated with takeovers. Therefore, even if a takeover proposal presents in-
vestors with an attractive opportunity to sell their shares at a profit,
advocates of the antitakeover position would have directors reject the
takeover if it would harm the interests of stakeholder groups.51
Restructurings in response to, or as a result of, hostile takeovers
often lead to major organizational changes within the target corporation,
including plant closings or relocations, with resulting job terminations.52
By some estimates, approximately 600,000 "white-collar" managers have
been eliminated as a result of corporate restructurings.53 These employee
layoffs then have a negative ripple effect throughout the community by
reducing the demand for goods and services and reducing the tax base of
the local community. 54 While some in-state effects are indisputable, cor-
porate restructurings can have an overall beneficial effect on the economy
by creating new jobs elsewhere. Further, new jobs can be created after
the completion of a restructuring which utilizes a corporation's assets
more efficiently. Consequently, there is no showing that the overall effect
upon the national economy is harmful. In fact, one commentator con-
tends that there is no evidence indicating that takeovers produce any
more plant closings or layoffs than would otherwise have occurred . 5
Further, takeovers typically improve the economic efficiency of a corpo-
ration, by redeploying corporate assets to their most valued uses. 56
50. Coffee, supra note 8, at 8.
51. See Coffee, supra note 8.
52. Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, supra note 25, at 1459.
53. See Greenhouse, Surge in Prematurely Jobless, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1986, at 21, col. 2
(natl. ed.)., quoted from Coffee, supra note 8, at 7, n. 14. The macroeconomic effect of these job
layoffs has been estimated as costing the economy between 0.5% and 1% of GNP in 1985. Jonas,
Berger & Pennar, Do All These Deals Help or Hurt the U.S. Economy?, Bus. Wk., Nov. 24, 1986, at
86, 87 (quoting Edward Hyman of Cyrus J. Lawrence, Inc.), as quoted from Coffee, supra note 8, at
6, n.7. While the empirical results noted above would tend to indicate that the macroeconomic effect
of these job layoffs tends to harm the national economy, these results are neither conclusive, nor a
definite indication of a harmful effect. A persuasive argument can be made that while the immediate
effects of these job layoffs appears harmful, the long-term effect will be beneficial to the national
economy by repositioning the labor force into more productive jobs and industries.
54. Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, supra note 25, at 1453, n.11.
55. Jensen, Takeovers" Folklore and Science, HARV. Bus. REv. 109, 114 (Nov.-Dec. 1984).
56. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 29, at 1190. For example, T. Boone Pickens threatened
Gulf Oil with a hostile takeover in 1984. While Gulf Oil eventually wound up being acquired by
Standard Oil of California, the eventual takeover resulted in improved economic efficiency by a
[Vol. 66:863
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The major flaw in the argument in favor of antitakeover legislation
is the unduly narrow purpose of the legislation. The predominantly as-
serted legislative purpose in antitakeover legislation prior to Act 36 has
been to protect investors from coercive action.5 7 However, it has become
clear that the real purpose is to protect incumbent management and in-
state stakeholder constituencies from the perceived disruptive effects of
hostile tender offers. 58 State legislatures have questioned whether ob-
taining the benefits of control premium for a widely dispersed class of
investors was consistent with the state's responsibilities to its stakehold-
ers.59 Accordingly, there has been an increasing tendency for state legis-
latures to enact antitakeover legislation after lobbying efforts from local
companies under siege from hostile tender offers.6° Unfortunately, this
outlook not only takes an artificially narrow view of the national eco-
nomic interests involved, it also has the practical effect of "rendering
shareholders defenseless against their managements" 61 by allowing direc-
tors to justify any rejection of a hostile takeover as against the existing
interests of the stakeholders.
C. Opposition to State Antitakeover Legislation: Restriction of the
Interstate Market for Corporate Control
Up to this point, the policy arguments for and against state antitake-
drastic reduction in Gulf's domestic oil exploration costs. Prior to the takeover, Gulf had invested
enormous amounts of cash into domestic exploration for crude oil at a point when market prices for
crude oil could not justify these expenditures. Standard Oil was able to improve the economic effi-
ciency of the combined company merely by turning off the expenditure spigot. R. HIGGINS, ANALY-
SIS FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, 278-285 (1989).
57. CTS, 481 U.S. at 89-91.
58. The economic costs of plant closings, loss of employment, and loss of the corporation's
chain of customers and suppliers normally falls inordinately upon the state where the corporation
had its most substantial presence. See Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, supra note 25, at 1460-
61. Pennsylvania was particularly sensitive to this issue, with venerable companies such as Gulf Oil
and Pennwalt losing their independence. See also, Coffee, supra note 8, at 93. However, to the
extent that the focus of the legislative intent in antitakeover legislation has changed from ensuring
shareholder protection to affording protection for in-state stakeholder interests, it may be subject to
a heightened scrutiny under the Commerce Clause. For an analysis, see infra notes 234-61 and
accompanying text. Even Professor Coffee, who supports takeover regulation on behalf of stake-
holders, recognizes that virtually any aspect of corporate governance law can be manipulated to chill
takeovers. Coffee, supra note 8, at 96.
59. Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, supra note 25, at 1461. For a listing of third-genera-
tion antitakeover legislation adopted by state legislatures under pressure from home-based compa-
nies under the pressure of a hostile tender offer, see note 248 infra.
60. See Steinberg, supra note 45, at 83-85. Similarly, the financial press has dubbed the new
Pennsylvania statute the "Armstrong Act." 9 EXEC. RPr. at 22.
61. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 255 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other
grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987). Managers of a target corporation, including outside directors, have a
clear conflict of interest by erecting obstacles to a hostile investor who is likely to fire them if the
takeover succeeds. Id. at 256.
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over law have focused on either the interests of investors or in-state
stakeholders. This section proposes that the proper analysis of antitake-
over legislation must begin by focusing upon the broader interests in-
volved-that of the national economy.
The main problem with state antitakeover legislation is that it im-
pedes the national economy by unduly restricting the interstate market
for corporate control. State antitakeover legislation, by increasing the
risk that (i) an offer will not be made, or (ii) an offer will not succeed,
significantly reduces competition among potential bidders in the inter-
state market for corporate control. 62 When tender offers are not made or
do not succeed because of state antitakeover legislation, such parochial
state legislation is preventing the free flow of assets to their highest and
best uses. Preventing the free flow of assets to their most efficient uses
impedes the growth of the national economy, by forcing corporate assets
to remain in undervalued uses in states that have adopted antitakeover
legislation. State legislation preventing the interstate movement of cor-
porate economic assets is just the type of parochial legislation that the
Commerce Clause was intended to prevent.
The issue remaining then is what role is available for the states in
the field of takeover legislation? Any legislation whose purpose and ef-
fect is to either enhance the bidding process63 or to increase the informa-
tional efficiency of the securities markets by requiring additional
disclosure regarding a proposed takeover would still be permissible. 64 In
contrast, when the purpose and effect of state antitakeover legislation is
to prevent assets from freely flowing to their highest valued use (since, as
shown in several states, the purpose of state antitakeover legislation is to
protect incumbent management and in-state stakeholder constituen-
cies), 65 the interests of the national economy must be protected from this
discriminatory legislation.
66
62. See infra notes 223-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the methods in which
state antitakeover legislation makes tender offers riskier and more expensive.
63. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of steps management of a
target corporation can take to enhance the bidding process for the target corporation.
64. While state legislation whose purpose and effect is to increase the informational efficiency of
the securities markets would still be permissible under this hypothesis, it would in most cases be
superfluous, considering the objectives and requirements of the Williams Act. See infra notes 67-80
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Williams Act.
65. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 234-61 and accompanying text.
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III. THE HISTORY OF ANTITAKEOVER LEGISLATION: FROM THE
WILLIAMS ACT TO CTS CORP. V. DYNAMICS CORP. OF
AMERICA
The proliferation of, and the perceived abuses associated with, cash
tender offers in the early 1960s prompted Congress to enact the Williams
Act67 in 1968. The use of cash tender offers had increased during the
1960s as corporate raiders discovered a gap in then-existing federal se-
curities law. 68 By making a cash tender offer for the stock of a target
corporation, the corporate raider was able to avoid the federal regula-
tions attendant in either a proxy contest 69 or a stock exchange offer.
70
Cash tender offers were fraught with potential for abuse, as a raider
could stampede investors into tendering their shares, without providing
adequate time or information with which to evaluate the fairness of the
tender offer.
71
The primary purpose of the Williams Act was to put investors on
eeqdal footing with both bidders and incumbent management by requiring
adequate disclosure of information regarding tender offers, as well as suf-
ficient time to evaluate the fairness of such offers. 72 While Congress's
primary goal in enacting the Williams Act was providing investor protec-
tion, Congress sought to achieve this goal by regulating the tender offer
process, not the merit of tender offers. 73 Thus, the specific items enacted
67. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)&(e) and 78n(d)-(f) (1988). The Williams Act is an amendment to the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Id.
68. See Hablutzel & Selmer, Hostile Corporate Takeovers" History and Overview, 8 N. ILL. L.
REV. 203, 205 (1988). "The need for such legislation has been caused by the increased use of cash
tender offers rather than the regular proxy fight to gain control of publicly owned corporations...
(t)his legislation will close a significant gap in investor protection under the federal securities laws
.... " 113 CONG. REC. 854 (1967). (Remarks of Senator Williams).
69. Generally, state corporation law allows shareholders to either vote in person or by proxy
(agency). Proxy contests occur when insurgent shareholders solicit proxies from other shareholders
to obtain control of a company. Hablutzel & Selmer, supra note 68, at 203-4.
70. In a stock exchange offer, the acquiror issues new securities to the target firm's sharehold-
ers. Id. at 205. By avoiding the federal regulations attendant in either a proxy contest or stock
exchange offer, the corporate raider was able to avoid significant expenses. Id.
71. For example, prior to the Williams Act, a bidder could have made a tender offer with only
one or two days for investors to evaluate the offer. By forcing investors to quickly evaluate an offer,
investors could have been stampeded to tender, for fear of missing out on an attractive opportunity.
Specific provisions of the Williams Act were aimed at ensuring adequate disclosure of information
regarding the tender offer, as well as sufficient time to evaluate the terms of the offer. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d)(l) (1988) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1990).
72. See Hablutzel & Selmer, supra note 68, at 208. The Senate Committee stated:
The Committee has taken extreme care to avoid tipping the balance of regulation in favor
of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid. The bill is designed to
require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors while at the same time providing
the offeror and management equal opportunity to present their case.
S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 550].
73. Recognizing that Congress only sought to regulate the tender offer process, and not the
substance of tender offers, becomes important in a subsequent analysis of whether state antitakeover
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to ensure investor protection were the Act's disclosure and cooling-off
provisions. The disclosure provisions require that anyone making a
tender offer for more than five percent of a class of securities file an infor-
mation statement with the SEC, the target company, and the target's
shareholders when the tender offer is made.7 4 The cooling-off provisions
of the Williams Act require the tender offer to be kept open at least
twenty days, in order to insure investors have adequate time to evaluate
the substantive fairness of the offer.
75
While the Williams Act was enacted to insure investor protection,
Congress clearly did not intend to completely prohibit tender offers. 76 In
fact, the final provisions of the Williams Act attempted to remain neutral
between management and the bidder. 77 While the disclosure provisions
of the Williams Act, as originally introduced, "were avowedly pro-man-
agement in the target company's efforts to defeat the takeover bid,"
'78
Congress became convinced "that takeover bids should not be discour-
aged because they serve a useful check on entrenched but inefficient man-
agement."7 9 Thus, the Williams Act was intended to prevent abusive
tender offers, by establishing a process whereby tender offers could be
regulated as a fair fight between incumbent management and the
bidder.80
In this context of federally legislated neutrality, the states, under
pressure from incumbent management, began to enact the first genera-
tion of antitakeover legislation."' This first generation of antitakeover
legislation lasted until the Supreme Court declared the Illinois antitake-
over statute unconstitutional in Edgar v. MITE Corp.82 A plurality of
the Court found that the Illinois antitakeover statute frustrated the objec-
tives of the Williams Act on three important grounds, and therefore was
preempted by the Supremacy Clause.83 The Court also found that the
statutes impermissibly conflict with the Williams Act. See the Supremacy Clause analysis, infra Part
V-A.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1988). The information statement must disclose the identity of the
proposed acquiror, the source and amount of funds to be used for the tender offer, and plans for the
target company. Id. §§ 78m(d)(1)(a)-(c).
75. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1990).
76. Hablutzel & Selmer, supra note 68, at 208.
77. S. REP. No. 550, supra note 72.
78. Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 30 (1977).
79. S. REP. No. 550, supra note 72.
80. Hablutzel & Selmer, supra note 68, at 207.
81. Id. at 209-10.
82. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
83. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause provides that "[t]his Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." Id.
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Illinois statute violated the Commerce Clause.8 4
First, the MITE plurality"5 found that the precommencement notifi-
cation provisions of the Illinois Business Take-Over Act8 6 were inconsis-
tent with the objectives of the Williams Act. The precommencement
notification provisions of the Illinois statute required a bidder to notify
both the secretary of state and the target company of its intent to make a
tender offer 20 business days before the offer became effective.8 7 The
state's asserted justification for the entire statute, including the precom-
mencement notification provisions, was to "protect the interests of Illi-
nois security holders . . .without unduly impeding take-over offers." 88
The plurality rejected the state's justification, reasoning that the precom-
mencement notification provisions frustrated the Williams Act's balance
between management and the bidder, by providing management with ad-
ditional time to adopt defensive measures to defeat a takeover attempt. 89
Second, the Illinois statute allowed the secretary of state to call a
hearing With respect to the tender offer. 9° Further, the tender offer could
not proceed until the hearing was completed, and there was no deadline
for the completion of the hearing. 9' The plurality reasoned that these
provisions frustrated the Congressional intent of the Williams Act "by
introducing extended delay into the tender offer process,"' 92 thereby
favoring management at the expense of investors.
93
Third, the Illinois Act permitted the secretary of state to pass on the
substantive fairness of a tender offer, by authorizing the secretary of state
to deny registration of a tender offer if "the take-over offer is inequitable
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have
Power ... to regulate Commerce ... among the several States." Id.
85. Justice White delivered an opinion, in which he was joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun as to the conclusion that the Illinois Act was preempted by the Williams Act.
Justices White, Burger, Stevens and O'Connor found that the Illinois Act violated the Commerce
Clause by directly regulating interstate commerce. In the majority opinion of the Court, Justices
White, Burger, Stevens, O'Connor and Powell found that the Illinois Act violated the Commerce
Clause by indirectly regulating interstate commerce. MITE, 457 U.S. at 625. Justice Powell made it
clear that his purpose in joining the majority opinion was to limit the Court's views on tender offers
to the narrowest possible issue (the indirect regulation analysis under the Commerce Clause),
thereby leaving some room in state law for regulation of tender offers. Id. at 646.
86. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.51-137.70 (1979), repealed by P.A. 83-365, § 1
(1983).
87. MITE, 457 U.S. at 635-6.
88. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.51, repealed by P.A. 83-365, § 1 (1983).
89. MITE, 457 U.S. at 635.
90. The secretary of state was required to call a hearing if at least 10% of the shareholders
residing in Illinois requested a hearing. Id. at 637. The plurality reasoned that because manage-
ment, in many instances, will control at least 10% of a company's shares, that this gave incumbent






.... , While these substantive-fairness provisions attempted to offer
protection to investors, they precluded individual investors from making
their own evaluation of the fairness of the tender offer. Therefore, the
plurality found that the substantive fairness provisions conflicted with
the Williams Act's policy of investor autonomy.95
The MITE Court then addressed the issue of whether the Illinois
Act violated the Commerce Clause. First, a plurality of the Court found
that the Illinois Act violated the Commerce Clause by directly regulating
interstate commerce.96 The provisions of the Illinois Act were such that,
for example, the secretary of state could deny registration of a tender
offer for a Delaware corporation merely because Illinois shareholders
owned 10% of the stock subject to the tender offer. 97 The plurality rea-
soned that since the Illinois Act could not only prevent a bidder from
making a tender offer to Illinois shareholders, but also to shareholders
residing in other states with no connection to Illinois, the Illinois Act
attempted to directly regulate interstate commerce by asserting extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction over residents of other states. 98 The plurality opinion
noted that the operation of the Illinois statute would thoroughly stifle
interstate commerce in securities transactions.99
Second, a majority of the MITE Court found the Illinois Act vio-
lated the Commerce Clause under the Pike v. Bruce Church Inc.t°° bal-
ancing test. Under this test, when a statute regulates even handedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest with only incidental effects on
interstate commerce, the statute will be upheld; however, where the bur-
den imposed on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
local benefits, the statute will be overturned. 1 01 In applying the Pike bal-
94. MITE, 457 U.S. at 639.
95. Id. at 640. See also S. REP. No. 550, supra note 72.
96. MITE, 457 U.S. at 640.
97. The Illinois Act applied even if no shareholders were Illinois residents. A target company
covered by the provisions of the Illinois Act was a corporation of which Illinois shareholders owned
10% of the stock subject to the tender offer, or for which any two of the following three conditions
were met:
1) the corporation had its principal executive offices in Illinois,
2) the corporation was organized under the laws of Illinois, or,
3) the corporation had at least 10% of its stated capital and paid in surplus represented
within the state.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.52-10, repealed by P.A. 83-365, § 1 (1983).
98. MITE, 457 U.S. at 642-43.
99. Id. at 642.
100. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
101. Id. at 142. The Arizona statute at issue in Pike would have required a commercial grower
to pack all cantaloupes in standard packing crates before the fruit could be transported out of state.
This regulation would have required the grower to construct extensive packing facilities. The Pike
Court found that the state's tenuous interest of having the grower's cantaloupes identified as
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ancing test, the MITE Court balanced the burden imposed by the Illinois
Act against the purported benefits of the statute.
The MITE Court found that permitting the Illinois secretary of
state to decide whether nationwide tender offers should proceed-for ex-
ample, because Illinois shareholders might have held 10 percent of the
target corporation' 02-would impose a substantial burden on interstate
commerce. 0 3 If Illinois could wield the power to preclude nationwide
tender offers, shareholders could be deprived of the opportunity to real-
ize control premium. 104 Further, the reallocation of corporate assets to
their highest and most efficient use is hindered.10 5 Finally, the built-in
check against inefficient, entrenched management by the threat of a hos-
tile tender offer is removed. 106
On the other hand, the MITE Court found the purported local bene-
fits of shareholder protection and regulation of the internal affairs10 7 of
Illinois corporations to be lacking legitimacy. While protecting share-
holders is a legitimate state objective, the MITE Court found that Illinois
had no interest in protecting nonresident shareholders.'0 8 The Court was
originating from Arizona could not justify the burden of constructing an unneeded packing facility.
Id.
102. See supra note 97 and accompanying text for a description of the potential nationwide reach
of the Illinois statute. Clearly, a 10 - 20% position in a target corporation which had the power to
substantially delay or completely prohibit a bid would preclude many, if not most, hostile tender
offers from ever being launched. Moreover, unlike state blue sky regulations, a bidder could not
avoid the problems associated with the Illinois statute by excluding the offer from Illinois. The
Williams Act requires that tender offers be made to all shareholders nondiscriminately. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d)(6) (1988).
103. There were two kinds of commerce problems present in MITE. First, the Illinois statute
unduly burdened the interstate market for corporate control, exclusive of economic benefits available
to shareholders. Second, the Illinois statute unduly burdened interstate commerce by denying share-
holders the economic benefits ordinarily present in a tender offer. The MITE analysis narrowly
focused only on the second commerce problem. While MITE was appropriately decided, exclusion
of the first commerce problem caused an improper result in the CTS decision. See infra notes 114-
40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's decision in CTS.
104. MITE, 457 U.S. at 643. See supra notes 39 and 40 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the benefits of control premium.
105. MITE, 457 U.S. at 643. See supra note 41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
benefits to shareholders from a reallocation of corporate assets. The MITE Court only analyzed the
reallocation of corporate assets as a benefit to shareholders. As explained in Part II-C of this Note,
the broader focus should be on the beneficial effect of the reallocation of corporate assets on the
national economy.
106. MITE, 457 U.S. at 643. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the beneficial effects of the takeover process as a check against inefficient, entrenched management.
107. The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict-of-laws principle stating that only one state should
have the authority to regulate matters pertaining to the relationships between a corporation and its
officers, directors, and shareholders. The purpose of the internal affairs doctrine is to prevent a
corporation from facing conflicting demands. MITE, 457 U.S. at 645.
108. Id. at 644. This analysis crystallizes the fact that it is virtually impossible to protect a
state's resident shareholders without regulating the entire tender offer. Thus, second and third-
generation antitakeover statutes have been rewritten to regulate only transactions of a state's created
corporations, but not to regulate interstate commerce per se. So, to the extent that second and third-
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not impressed with provisions in the Illinois Act that exempted a man-
agement self-tender from the Act's coverage. The Court found these pro-
visions at variance with the asserted legislative purpose of shareholder
protection. '09
Furthermore, the MITE majority found Illinois' proposed justifica-
tion of the Illinois Act under the internal affairs doctrine to be "incredi-
ble," since the terms of the statute could have been specifically applied to
foreign corporations. 0 The majority held that Illinois had no interest in
regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations."'
Based on the MITE decision, many commentators believed any state
antitakeover legislation was preempted by federal law. 1 2 Accordingly,
many state antitakeover statutes began to fall in the courts.113 In this
context, the Court's decision upholding the Indiana Control Share Ac-
quisitions Chapter" 4 (Indiana Act) in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America," 5 came as a surprise to some commentators."
6
Under the terms of the Indiana Act at issue in CTS, a person ac-
quired "control shares" whenever shares were acquired that, but for the
operation of the Indiana Act, would bring a person's voting power to or
above any of three thresholds: 20%, 33 1/3%, or 50%.1 7  Control
shares can only obtain voting rights if conferred by a majority of the
corporation's "disinterested shareholders."" Alternatively, the control
generation antitakeover legislation is justified as providing protection for resident shareholders, the
state's interest still lacks legitimacy.
109. Id. at 645. Further, the Court was not convinced that the Illinois Act afforded investors
any more-substantial protection than already offered under the Williams Act. Id. at 644-45.
110. Id. at 645. The terms of the Illinois Act could apply if 10% of the outstanding shares of the
target company were held by Illinois residents, regardless of the target's state of incorporation. Id.
111. Id. at 645-46.
112. See, eg., Hablutzel & Selmer, supra note 68, at 213; see also, Booth, The Promise of State
Takeover Statutes, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1635, 1639 (1988).
113. See Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S.
69 (1987) (invalidating Indiana statute); Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th
Cir. 1986) (invalidating Ohio statute); Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th
Cir. 1983) (invalidating Oklahoma statute).
114. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-I to -11 (Bums Cum. Supp. 1986).
115. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
116. See Booth, supra note 112, at 1639.
117. CTS, 481 U.S. at 73. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1 comment. The first threshold
(20%) represents a significant level of dominance in a public corporation with dispersed share own-
ership. Thus, a 20% position can constitute effective control in some circumstances. Indiana be-
lieved the second threshold (33 1/3%) is generally recognized to constitute effective control of a
corporation in most circumstances. The 50% threshold constitutes literal control. Id. The opera-
tion of the Indiana Act would apparently require control-share approval any time someone acquired
voting power that would cross any of the three levels. Thus, control-share approval would be re-
quired once at 20%, a second time at 33 1/3%, and a final time at 50% if the shares were acquired
in a series of separate transactions. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1.
118. "Disinterested shareholders" excludes all shares with respect to which the acquiring per-
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shares can be denied voting rights by a majority of the corporation's dis-
interested shareholders. 1 9 Voting rights may be conferred upon control
shares either at the next regularly scheduled meeting of shareholders, or
at a specially scheduled meeting. 20 The acquiring person may require
management to hold a special meeting of shareholders to consider the
issue of voting rights. Such a special meeting shall be held within 50 days
from the acquiring person's request for such a meeting, if an "acquiring
person statement" is filed and the acquiring person agrees to pay the
expenses of the meeting.' 2' The practical effect of these provisions is to
"condition acquisition of control of a corporation on approval of a ma-
jority of pre-existing disinterested shareholders."'
' 22
On March 27, 1986, the board of directors of CTS, an Indiana cor-
poration, opted into coverage of the revised Indiana Business Corpora-
tion Law,' 23 the provisions of which included the Indiana Act.
Previously, on March 10, 1986, Dynamics Corporation of America (Dy-
namics) had commenced a tender offer for one million shares of CTS
common stock. This tender offer, if successful, would have raised Dy-
namics' ownership interest in CTS to 27.5%.124 Thus, Dynamics' tender
offer, which would have elevated its percentage ownership in CTS above
the 20% threshold, brought the tender offer squarely within the coverage
of the Indiana Act.' 25 As a result, Dynamics brought suit seeking to
enjoin the enforcement of the Indiana Act on the grounds that the Act
violated both the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses.
26
In analyzing whether the Indiana Act was preempted by the Wil-
son, officers, or inside directors of the corporation may exercise voting control. IND. CODE ANN.
§ 23-1-42-3.
119. Control shares only have voting rights "to the extent granted by resolution approved by the
[disinterested] shareholders of the issuing public corporation." IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9 (Burns
Cum. Supp. 1986).
120. Id. § 23-1-42-7.
121. Id. The requirements of the "acquiring person statement" include both the identity of the
acquiring person and the terms of the control share acquisition. Id. § 23-1-42-6.
122. CIS, 481 U.S. at 74. By requiring a majority vote of the disinterested shareholders, the
Indiana law requires that the shareholders affirmatively grant the new owner power to carry out a
change in the corporation's control.
123. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-17-1. Generally, the revised Indiana Business Corporation Law
(BCL) was to apply to certain Indiana corporations in existence after July 31, 1987. However, as in
CTS, the board of directors of an Indiana corporation could opt into the statute's coverage before
that date by a resolution electing to have the revised BCL apply prior to July 31, 1987. Id. § 23-1-
17-3. The Indiana Act also includes an opt out scheme whereby a corporation may opt out of the
coverage of the control share acquisition provisions. Id. § 23-1-42-5.
124. CTS, 481 U.S. at 75. Prior to announcing the tender offer, Dynamics owned 9.6% of the
common stock of CTS. Id.
125. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1.
126. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 251 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other
grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
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liams Act, the CTS Court, although not required to do so, adopted the
line of reasoning of the MITE plurality. 127 The Supremacy Clause rea-
soning of the MITE plurality was summarized by Justice Powell as fol-
lows: any state statute which upsets the delicate balance between
incumbent management and bidders, to the detriment of shareholders, is
preempted by the Williams Act.128 Unlike the Illinois statute before the
MITE Court, the CTS Court concluded that the Indiana Act furthered
the purposes of the Williams Act, by protecting the independent share-
holder against both management and the bidder. 
129
In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized two primary fea-
tures of the Indiana Act. First, the CTS Court found that the principal
effect of the Indiana Act was "to grant shareholders the power to deliber-
ate collectively about the merits of tender offers."' 3 0 By this method of
collective deliberation, the Court found that the Indiana Act protects
shareholders from the coercive effects of tender offers. 131 Second, the
Court noted that although the Indiana Act provided that the special
meeting of shareholders could be held within 50 days of the commence-
ment of the tender offer, nothing in the Indiana Act imposed an absolute
50 day delay on the consummation of a tender offer, nor did the Indiana
Act prohibit a bidder from purchasing shares immediately after the 20
day period provided under the Williams Act.' 32 Further, the CTS Court
found nothing in the MITE plurality opinion suggesting that any delay
127. As the MITE plurality opinion did not represent the views of the majority of the Court as
to the preemptive effect of the Williams Act, the CTS Court was not bound by the MITE analysis.
The CTS Court chose to use the MITE analysis, however, because it found that the Indiana Act
could still pass muster under a broad interpretation of the Williams Act. CTS, 481 U.S. at 81.
128. Id. at 80-82.
129. Id. at 82.
130. Id. at 82, n.7. The Court concluded that the Indiana Act operated on the assumption that
independent shareholders confronted with a tender offer are often at a disadvantage. Id. See also
Booth, supra note 112. The concern in a two-tier or partial tender offer is that shareholders may be
coerced into tendering their shares at a lower price than might be available in an "any and all"
tender offer. A bidder may offer a higher price for the first 51% of a target's shares, and a lower
price for the remaining 49% of the target's shares. Shareholders may therefore be coerced into
tendering in the first tier, in order to avoid being forced to tender their shares at the lower price in
the second tier. Id. This accounts for the CTS Court's reasoning that independent shareholders
confronted with a tender offer are often at a disadvantage.
131. The Court explained that shareholders, acting as a group under the provisions of the Indi-
ana Act, could reject a coercive, two-tier tender offer. Such a coercive offer could be rejected by
denying voting rights to the control shares. However, an individual shareholder confronted with a
coercive, two-tier tender offer would rush to tender in the first tier, for fear of being cashed out at a
depressed price in the second tier of the coercive offer. CT's, 481 U.S. at 83.
132. Of course, if the bidder moves forward and purchases the control shares within the 20 day
period permitted by federal law, the bidder runs the risk of subsequently being denied voting rights.
However, the Court reasoned that if a bidder feared a rejection of voting rights by the disinterested
shareholders, a tender offer could be made conditional upon the grant of voting rights to the control
shares. Id. at 84.
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was impermissible-only delay that would unreasonably impede the in-
vestor and offeror from going forward with the transaction was prohib-
ited.133 For these reasons, the CTS Court held that the Indiana Act was
not preempted by the Williams Act.' 34
The CTS Court then addressed whether the Indiana Act violated
the Commerce Clause. The Court's Commerce Clause analysis ex-
amined whether the Indiana Act: discriminated against interstate com-
merce; created an impermissible risk of inconsistent regulation; or was
rationally related to its regulatory scheme.' 35  The Court quickly dis-
posed of the first two questions. The Court concluded that the Indiana
Act did not discriminate against interstate commerce, because nothing in
the Indiana Act imposed a greater burden on out-of-state bidders than on
bidders residing in Indiana. 36 Second, the CTS Court concluded that
because the Indiana Act sought to regulate only Indiana corporations,
nothing in the statute created an impermissible risk of inconsistent regu-
lation by the states. 37
Finally, the CTS Court addressed whether the purposes of the Indi-
ana Act were rationally related to the Act's regulatory scheme. The test
used was whether the regulatory scheme of providing for control-share
approval was rationally related to the Indiana Act's stated goals of inves-
tor protection and state power to delineate the powers and rights of
shares in the state's created corporations. The CTS Court placed special
emphasis on the internal affairs doctrine. 3 8 The Court recognized that
the effect of laws regulating corporate governance would, in certain cir-
cumstances, incidentally regulate interstate commerce. However, to the
133. The 50-day period provided for in the Indiana Act was within the 60-day period Congress
provided for reinstitution of withdrawal rights. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(dX5). The Court found that a
delay within a congressionally proscribed period could not be held unreasonable. CTS, 481 U.S. at
85. However, in the context of a hostile tender offer, an additional 30-day possible delay, under the
control of incumbent management, can give management an enormous advantage in erecting obsta-
cles to the takeover. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 29. For this reason, this particular
part of the Court's reasoning is questionable.
134. CTS, 481 U.S. at 86-87.
135. The CTS Court apparently did not engage in the Pike balancing test discussed in notes 100-
11 and accompanying text. At least one commentator has concluded that the CTS Court did not
engage in the Pike balancing test. See Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH.
L. REV. 1865, 1866 (1987). In addition, Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in CTS states that the
inquiry of the Pike balancing test is ill suited to the judiciary and should be undertaken "rarely if at
all." CTS, 481 U.S. at 95.
136. CTS, 481 U.S. at 88.
137. Id. at 89. "So long as each State regulates voting rights only in the corporations it has
created, each corporation will be subject to only the law of only one State." Id.
138. "It thus is an accepted part of the business landscape in this country for States to create
corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define the rights that are acquired by purchasing their
shares." Id. at 91.
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extent that the Indiana Act hindered the interstate market for corporate
control, the CTS Court found this burden was justified by Indiana's
"substantial interest" in protecting its created corporations and in pro-
tecting shareholders. Accordingly, the Court held that the Indiana Act's
stated purposes of protecting its created corporations and shareholders in
these corporations were rationally related to the Act's regulatory scheme.
Thus, the Court held the Indiana Act did not violate the Commerce
Clause. 139
In light of the CTS decision, the Court has made it clear that it
ascribes to no particular policy as to the merits of antitakeover legisla-
tion. However, the Court's opinion should not be read as validating all
antitakeover legislation in the wake of CTS.14° The real issue that must
be examined in the future of antitakeover legislation is how far the inter-
nal affairs doctrine can be used to control the interstate market for corpo-
rate control. With that issue in mind, this Note next examines the
specific provisions and purposes of the Pennsylvania statute.
IV. THE PENNSYLVANIA STATUTE
The provisions of Act 36 significantly restrict the ability of a hostile
bidder to launch a successful tender offer or proxy fight for a registered
Pennsylvania corporation. The specific provisions of Act 36 make a hos-
tile takeover more difficult and expensive by: 1) allowing the corpora-
tion's directors to consider stakeholder interests in evaluating the effect
of a proposed business combination; 2) requiring a majority vote of the
"disinterested shares" of the corporation in order to obtain control of the
corporation; 3) providing for a forced redemption of any shares denied
voting rights in a control-share acquisition; 4) requiring a controlling
person to "disgorge," or forfeit, any profits realized on an unapproved
disposition of the target corporation's stock within eighteen months of
becoming a controlling person; 5) requiring minimum severance compen-
sation to be paid to any employee terminated within two years of a con-
trol-share acquisition; and, 6) requiring continuation of labor contracts
within five years of a business combination. While the final two provi-
sions regulating severance compensation and labor contracts are permis-
sible areas for state regulation, these provisions have no legitimate place
in a state's antitakeover law. The following sections analyze both the
specific provisions and the articulated intent of Act 36.
139. Id. at 94.
140. The Indiana Act only concerns the voting rights of bidders. Other state antitakeover legis-
lation may still be struck down as an undue restraint on the interstate market for corporate control.
Booth, supra note 112, at 1680-81.
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A. Fiduciary Duties of Directors
Prior to Act 36, Pennsylvania corporation law permitted directors
to consider stakeholder interests as part of their fiduciary duties to the
corporation.1 41 What was apparently lacking under existing corporation
law was the statutory authorization for directors to determine that the
interests of the corporation's nonshareholder constituencies could
predominate over the interests of the corporation's shareholders.
The fiduciary duty provisions of Act 36 erased any doubt that direc-
tors of Pennsylvania corporations may consider stakeholder interests as
predominant over those of the shareholder. The fiduciary duty provi-
sions permit directors to consider "the effects of any action upon any or
all groups affected by such action, including shareholders, employees,
suppliers, customers and creditors of the corporation, and upon commu-
nities in which offices or other establishments of the corporation are lo-
cated."' 142  Directors also are not required, in considering the best
interests of the corporation, "to regard any corporate interest or the in-
terests of any particular group affected by such action as a dominant or
controlling factor."' 143 By way of specific example, Act 36 enumerates
that the fiduciary duty of a director does not require a director to act
''solely because of the effect such action might have on an acquisition or
potential or proposed acquisition of control of the corporation or the
consideration that might be offered or paid to shareholders in such an
acquisition. ' ' 144
A registered Pennsylvania corporation could elect to opt out of the
coverage of the fiduciary duty provisions either by amending the corpora-
tion's bylaws on or before July 26, 1990 or by specifically opting out of
such coverage in the corporation's articles of incorporation.145 Thus, the
opt out scheme provides an option for the corporation to remain under
141. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 511(b) (Purdon Supp. 1989). In discharging their fiduciary
duties, directors were allowed to "consider the effects of any action upon employees, upon suppliers
and customers of the corporation and upon communities in which offices or other establishments of
the corporation are located." Id.
142. Act of April 27, 1990 § 511(d)(1), supra note 5. The fiduciary duty provisions also provide
that directors may consider both the short-term and the long-term interests of the corporation. Id.
§ 51 1(d)(2). Similarly, the Delaware Supreme Court recently upheld the decision of the Time Inc.
board of directors to reject a hostile tender offer and manage the company for long-term value. See
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
143. Act of April 27, 1990 § 51 1(d)(4), supra note 5.
144. Id. § 511(e).
145. Id. § 511 (g)(1)-(2). One could argue that the opt out scheme blunts the harsh operation of
Act 36, by leaving investors free to invest only in corporations that elect to opt out of statutory
coverage. The reply to this argument is that the interests of the national economy can still be
harmed by the companies that do not elect to opt out of the coverage, thus shielding themselves from
a competitive market, which is the essence of our free market system.
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the full sway of the forces of the market. In fact, 91 of Pennsylvania's
300 public companies have opted out of the coverage of Act 36.146
B. Control-Share Acquisition Provisions
The Indiana control-share acquisition statute147 was upheld as con-
stitutional in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America.148 Therefore, the
control-share statute in CTS would serve as a good model for any state
seeking to include control-share provisions as part of its antitakeover
law. Pennsylvania's new antitakeover statute is no exception in this re-
gard. The control-share acquisition provisions of Act 36 were obviously
patterned after the Indiana statute and are identical in many respects. 1
49
As in the Indiana statute, Act 36 attempts to establish the required
nexus with the state by making the control-share provisions applicable
only to registered corporations. 150 Under Pennsylvania corporation law,
a registered corporation is generally any domestic (Pennsylvania) corpo-
ration that has a class of securities registered under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.15 Act 36 lists numerous exceptions whereby the
control-share acquisition provisions do not apply, 152 including an opt out
scheme in which the corporation's articles or bylaws may be amended to
exclude a company from the statute's coverage.
153
"Control shares" are voting shares of a corporation that, if acquired,
would result in a control-share acquisition. 154 A "control-share acquisi-
tion" is an acquisition of voting power in such shares, that, if added to-
gether with all other voting power of the acquiring person, 155 would
enable the person to cast votes at or above any of the following three
146. N.Y.L.J., Oct. 9, 1990, p. 7. Companies that have opted out of the law's coverage include
giants such as Conrail, PPG Industries, H.J. Heinz, and Westinghouse. N.Y.L.J., Sept. 10, 1990, p.
5.
147. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -Il (Bums Cum. Supp. 1986).
148. 481 U.S. 69 (1987). CTS was a 6-3 majority decision authored by Justice Powell. The
majority opinion was joined by Justices Rehnquist, Brennan, Marshall, O'Connor and Scalia. Jus-
tice White filed a dissenting opinion in which he was joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens.
Justices Powell, Brennan and Marshall have since left the Court, and have been replaced by Justices
Kennedy, Souter and Thomas. The viability of third-generation antitakeover legislation such as Act
36 will depend on the votes of the latest jurists added to the Court.
149. For example, the Pennsylvania statute states that an "acquiring person" acquires "control
shares" whenever shares are acquired that, but for the operation of the statute, would bring its
voting power at or above any of three thresholds: 20%, 33 1/3%, or 50%. Act of April 27, 1990
§ 2562, supra note 5. The Indiana statute contains identical provisions. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-
42-1 (Bums Cum. Supp. 1986).
150. Act of April 27, 1990 § 2561(a), supra note 5.
151. Id. § 2502(l)(i).
152. Id. § 2561(b)(1)-(5).
153. Id. § 2561(b)(2).
154. Id. § 2562.
155. An acquiring person is a person who makes or proposes to make a control-share acquisi-
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thresholds: 20%, 33 1/3%, or 50%.156 In the key provision, control
shares do not have any voting rights unless a resolution approved by a
vote of shareholders grants voting rights to the control shares.1 57 Any
such resolution according voting rights to the control shares can be ap-
proved only by an affirmative vote of the corporation's "disinterested
shares."' 58 "Disinterested shares" include all voting shares of the target
corporation that are not beneficially owned by an acquiring person, exec-
utive officers or directors who are officers, or employee stock plans of the
target whose voting power is not confidentially vested in the employee
participants of the plan. 1
59
The issue of whether voting rights should be accorded the control
shares may be presented either at the next annual meeting of sharehold-
ers, or at a special meeting of shareholders called to consider the issue of
voting rights.16° The acquiring person may request a special meeting
only if the acquiring person: 1) makes a written request for a special
meeting; 2) files a detailed information statement with the registered cor-
poration; 3) makes a control-share acquisition or a bona fide written offer
to make a control-share acquisition, and; 4) agrees, in writing, to reim-
burse the corporation for the expenses of the special meeting. ' 6' Requir-
ing the acquiring person to pay the expenses of the special meeting adds
one additional cost to the total acquisition effort. It is this increase in
the total cost of the acquisition effort, coupled with the heightened poten-
tial to lose the takeover contest (through the operation of the control-
share provisions) that deters hostile bids. Further, control-share meeting
costs reduce shareholder wealth by contributing to overall acquisition
expenses that might otherwise increase the control premium.
A fully conforming information statement must include: the identity
of the acquiring person; 162 the number and class of shares owned prior to
the control-share acquisition and at the time of filing the information
statement; 63 the number and class of voting shares acquired or proposed
to be acquired and a specification of which three threshold levels ( 20%,
33 1/3%, or 50% ) the acquiring person's consummation of the control-
tion. Id. The definition of acquiring person set forth in § 2562 is sufficiently broad to encompass
any type of syndicate or group of persons acting in concert to make a control-share acquisition. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. § 2563(a).
158. Id.
159. Id. § 2562.
160. Id. § 2564(a)-(b).
161. Id. § 2564(a).
162. Act of April 27, 1990 § 2565(a)(1), supra note 5.
163. Id. § 2565(a)(3).
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share acquisition will result in;164 the terms of the acquisition, including
source of financing, plans for debt service and any pension fund which is
a potential source of consideration for the acquisition; 165 and, any plans
or proposals for the target corporation, including business combinations,
liquidations, plant or facility shutdowns, asset sales, transfers of business
operations to different locations, or any material changes in relationships
with suppliers, customers, or communities in which the corporation has
operations. 166 While the requirements of a fully conforming information
statement are comprehensive, they are virtually identical to the disclo-
sure requirements of the Williams Act 167 and therefore, the information
statement itself presents no Supremacy Clause problems.
If the acquiring person can meet all of these requirements, the spe-
cial meeting of shareholders must be held within 50 days. 168 The board
of directors of the target corporation is then required to provide notice of
the meeting to shareholders, including an statement expressing approval,
rejecting approval, or expressing no opinion with respect to according
voting rights to the control shares. 169 Unlike the permissive nature of the
fiduciary duty provisions of Act 36, in making this recommendation to
shareholders, the directors must specifically consider stakeholder inter-
ests. 170 At the special meeting, the "disinterested shares" of the corpora-
tion either accord or deny voting rights to the control shares.' 71
Providing for voting appears to be a good idea if the deal is just an offer.
In this way, the disinterested shares get an opportunity to determine
whether a change in control is appropriate. Unfortunately, when the bid
is opposed, the control-share provisions act as a significant roadblock for
management to thwart good offers.
C Forced Redemption
Act 36 provides that the corporation may redeem the control shares
if voting rights are denied, accorded and subsequently lapse, or if the
acquiring person does not request presentation of the issue of voting
rights. 17 2 Unlike the Indiana Act which provides for forced redemption
164. Id. § 2565(a)(4).
165. Id. § 2565(a)(5).
166. Id. § 2565(a)(6).
167. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)&(e) and 78n(d)-(f) (1988).
168. Act of April 27, 1990, § 2564(a), supra note 5.
169. Id. § 2564(c).
170. Id. § 2564(c)(3).
171. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
172. Act of April 27, 1990 § 2566, supra note 5. Voting rights accorded can subsequently lapse
if the control-share acquisition which was the subject of shareholder approval is not consummated
within 90 days of shareholder approval. Id. § 2563(b).
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at a fair price, 173 Act 36 presents a hidden danger for the hostile bidder.
The hidden danger to the acquiring person in the forced redemption pro-
vision is that the corporation may redeem the control shares at the aver-
age of the high and low sales prices, upon notice, at any time within
twenty-four months of the denial, lapse, or failure to present the issue of
voting rights. 174 Thus, the acquiring person may incur a substantial loss
on her front-end investment by a fluctuation in the market price of the
target corporation's stock. 175 The forced redemption provisions consti-
tute another substantial deterrent to making a hostile bid for a Penn-
sylvania corporation.
D. Disgorgement of Profits
The provisions of Act 36 providing for disgorgement of profits are
among the most controversial of the statute because they provide that, in
certain circumstances, profits on dispositions of securities of Penn-
sylvania corporations will be "disgorged," or forfeited, to the corpora-
tion. 176 These provisions are controversial because, before Act 36, any
such profits belonged solely to the person selling the corporation's securi-
ties. For this reason, the disgorgement provisions of Act 36 will certainly
be subject to extensive scrutiny as other states attempt to define how far
their corporate governance law can be used to regulate takeover activity.
Perhaps because the Pennsylvania legislature recognized that the
disgorgement provisions would be subject to extensive scrutiny, both the
policy and the purpose of the disgorgement provisions were set forth in
section 2572 of Act 36. That section states that its purpose is to protect
covered corporations and the interests of various groups related to such
corporations from manipulative and coercive actions.' 77 The specific
manipulative and coercive actions section 2572 seeks to regulate are:
"greenmail;"' 178 preventing corporations from being put "in play;"' 79 en-
suring speculators who put corporations "in play" do not misappropriate
173. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-10.
174. Act of April 27, 1990 § 2563(b), supra note 5.
175. This is the exact scenario played out in the Belzberg-Armstrong drama. The Belzbergs
sustained a gross loss of $17 million as a result of market fluctuations in Armstrong's stock from
July, 1989 to May, 1990. N.Y. Times, May 31, 1990, Section D, at 5, col. 3.
176. Act of April 27, 1990 §§ 2571-2575, supra note 5.
177. Id. § 2572(a).
178. Id. § 2572(a)(1). "Greenmail" is a process whereby a corporate raider will purchase a mi-
nority position in a company vulnerable to takeover, hoping to intimidate management in repurchas-
ing the corporation's shares at a profit for the raider. Fin. Times, Sept. 12, 1990, Section I, at 29.
179. Act of April 27, 1990 § 2572(a)(2), supra note 5. A company can be put "in play," or on
the auction block, by any number of actions either outside of or within the company. For example, a




corporate values;' 80 and discouraging speculators from putting corpora-
tions "in play" for means of reaping short-term speculative profits.181
With the exception of greenmail, it is difficult to conceive how any ac-
tions related to putting a company "in play" represent manipulation or
coercion. While greenmail clearly is a coercive tactic,182 greenmail prac-
tices could easily be eliminated by erecting a state regulation prohibiting
greenmail. This alternative would eliminate the coercive practice of
greenmail, while allowing otherwise legitimate bids to proceed.
Section 2572 further states that it recognizes "the right and obliga-
tion of the Commonwealth to regulate and protect the corporations it
creates from abuses ... of its own laws affecting ... corporate govern-
ance .. ".. ,183 This sentence attempts to bootstrap the internal affairs
doctrine as the state's asserted purpose for its antitakeover law, as was
successfully done in the control-share statute at issue in CTS. 184 This
appears to be little more than a self-serving legislative justification for
discouraging takeovers of Pennsylvania companies, because the Penn-
sylvania provisions go beyond mere corporate governance to substantive
economic regulation, which is beyond the scope of the internal affairs
doctrine.
As with the control-share provisions of Act 36, the disgorgement
provisions establish the required nexus with the state by generally apply-
ing to all registered corporations.18 5 There are also numerous exceptions
when the disgorgement provisions do not apply. These exceptions in-
clude both an opt out scheme and a safe harbor for any dispositions ap-
proved by both the board of directors and a majority of the corporation's
shares entitled to vote on the issue of granting a safe harbor exemp-
tion.186 Thus, once a bidder gained control of a target corporation, the
disgorgement provisions could be effectively disarmed via the safe harbor
exemption.
The disgorgement provisions generally provide that any profit 87 re-
180. Id. § 2572(a)(3).
181. Id. § 2572(a)(4).
182. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). In Unocal, T. Boone
Pickens's offer for Unocal was never meant to succeed. The offer was made to attempt to "green-
mail" Unocal into buying back Pickens's Unocal stock at a premium not available to other Unocal
shareholders. Id. at 956 n.13.
183. Act of April 27, 1990 § 2572, supra note 5.
184. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
185. Act of April 27, 1990 § 2571, supra note 5. See supra note 151 and accompanying text for
the definition of a registered corporation.
186. Id. §§ 2571(b)(2) & (b)(7).
187. "Profit" is defined as the positive value, if any, of any difference between consideration
received on the disposition of securities and consideration paid on the acquisition of the securities,
including usual and customary broker's fees on both the purchase and the sale. Id. at § 2573.
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alized by any controlling person from the disposition of any equity secur-
ity of the target corporation to any other person (including the
corporation) 88 belongs to the corporation. 8 9 A "controlling person" is
anyone who has acquired, offered to acquire, or intends to acquire at
least 20% of the voting power over voting shares or any person who has
disclosed that it may seek to acquire control of the corporation. 19° The
disgorgement provisions apply to any profitable dispositions of equity se-
curities within eighteen months after attaining controlling person sta-
tus.191 Further, the provisions apply to any equity securities acquired
within twenty-four months prior to or eighteen months after attaining
controlling person status.
192
The disgorgement provisions are designed primarily to deter hostile
bids for Pennsylvania corporations. The only apparent benefits provided
by the disgorgement provisions are either illegitimate, or could be better
accomplished with a rule prohibiting greenmail. First, the disgorgement
provisions provide the corporation and the shareholders with a benefit by
providing additional funds for the corporate treasury after the disgorge-
ment of profits. However, this is not a legitimate objective of state corpo-
rate governance law, as it goes against the very principles on which our
free market system is founded. Second, while protecting a corporation
from the coercive practice of greenmail is a legitimate objective, it can be
more efficiently accomplished by merely erecting a rule prohibiting
greenmail. A rule prohibiting greenmail would protect the corporation
from coercion, while allowing legitimate bids to proceed.
By examining the disgorgement provisions carefully, one can see
that their primary purpose was to completely discourage a hostile bidder
from seriously considering a bid for a Pennsylvania corporation. The
disgorgement provisions apply to all securities bought even before the
offer is launched, thus further reducing competition for corporate control
and helping to entrench management. After all, entrenching manage-
ment is the whole point of the statute. State legislators need contribu-
tions from rich, entrenched managers who want to continue to be rich,
entrenched managers. The new owners, trying to efficiently run the tar-
get company after a takeover are not likely to be so friendly to the state
188. Since the statute's coverage includes dispositions to the corporation, "greenmail" is explic-
itly covered by the statute.
189. Id. § 2574.
190. Id. § 2573. The definition of controlling person is quite broad, as it includes anyone who
merely announces an intention to seek control, regardless of whether they control any of the target's
voting shares.
191. Id. § 2574(1).
192. Id. § 2574(2).
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legislators who tried to close the door on hostile bids. Again, to the ex-
tent that the true purpose of the legislation is recast in this protectionist
light, it should be subject to a heightened scrutiny.
E. Severance-Compensation Provisions
The severance-compensation, or tin parachute, 193 provisions of Act
36 generally provide that any eligible employee whose employment is ter-
minated 94 within ninety days before195 the control-share approval, or
within twenty-four months after the control-share approval, shall receive
a one-time lump sum payment from the employer equal to the minimum
severance amount. 1 96 An eligible employee is defined as any employee of
a corporation who was employed within ninety days before or on the
date control-share approval was granted and had been so employed for at
least two years. 197 Eligible employees must also perform their duties
within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 198 The minimum severance
amount is equal to the employee's weekly compensation times the
number of years of service, up to a maximum of twenty-six years.199
The severance compensation provisions are triggered by control-
share approval. Control-share approval occurs when both a control-
share acquisition 200 takes place and when such control shares are ac-
corded voting rights.20' Control-share approval also includes a control-
share acquisition which occurs pursuant to a merger, consolidation or
plan of share exchange to which the corporation is a party, if such con-
trol-share acquisition is the result of incumbent management fending off
a hostile bidder.20 2 Thus, management self-tenders 203 or a business com-
193. Severance compensation arrangements for upper level management are usually explicitly
contracted for and referred to as "golden parachutes." Conversely, severance arrangements for mid-
dle and lower-level corporate employees are typically not made by contract. Any such severance
arrangements are typically provided by statute and referred to as "tin parachutes." Tin parachute
provisions are provided by federal statute under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2101 (1989).
194. A termination is defined as any involuntary termination or a layoff of at least six months.
Act of April 27, 1990 § 2581, supra note 5. The statute recognizes exceptions for employee termina-
tions due to wilful misconduct of the employee. Id. at § 2582(a).
195. The statute provides for severance compensation if an employee was terminated within 90
days before the control-share approval if the termination was pursuant to either a formal or informal
arrangement with the acquiring person. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. § 2581.
198. Id.
199. Id. The minimum severance amount is reduced for any payments made to the employee
due to the termination. Id. at § 2582(a)(2). No payment is required if the employer voluntarily pays
the employee severance at least equal to the minimum severance amount. Id. at § 2582(b).
200. See supra note 156.
201. Act of April 27, 1990 § 2581, supra note 5. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
202. Act of April 27, 1990 § 2581, supra note 5.
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bination with a "white-knight" 2° 4 are not exempt from the statute's sev-
erance compensation provisions.
Standing alone, severance compensation provisions such as those in-
cluded in Act 36 are clearly within the state's police power. What is
troubling is the fact that such provisions have been made part and parcel
of the state's antitakeover law. Further, while the severance compensa-
tion provisions appear to provide workers of Pennsylvania corporations
with increased financial protection in the event of job termination, such
protection is a red herring. Act 36 provides no more severance protec-
tion than currently offered under federal law.20 5 One possible alternative
explanation for the inclusion of severance compensation provisions in the
state's antitakeover law is that the provisions were calculated to garner
political support from Pennsylvania workers.20 6
F. Continuation of Labor Contracts
The labor contract provisions of Act 36 provide that "[n]o business
combination transaction shall result in the termination or impairment...
of any covered labor contract .... -2o7 Business combination transac-
tions20 8 that are within the statute's reach include any business opera-
tions owned by a registered corporation (or any subsidiary) at the time of
a control-share approval.2° 9 The business operations must be within the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 210 and the business combination must
occur within five years of the control-share approval. 2 11 The statute's
provisions apply irrespective of the fact that the business operation is still
203. A "self-tender" by management takes place when a group led by existing management of
the corporation makes a tender offer for the corporation's shares, thus taking the company private,
typically through a leveraged buy-out (LBO). For a discussion of the increasing trend toward
LBO's, see Jensen, supra note 27.
204. Often, when management of a target corporation becomes the subject of a hostile tender
offer, they will seek out a "white knight," an acquiror that is friendly to existing management. For
example, when T. Boone Pickens made an unsolicited bid for Gulf Oil in late 1983, Gulf solicited
and ultimately ended up being acquired by Standard Oil of California, in March, 1984. R. HIGGINs,
supra note 56, 278-79.
205. See the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2101 (1989).
Under either the federal or the Pennsylvania approach, the target corporation will pay the costs of
the severance compensation. Thus, there are no apparent disincentives for the bidder of a Penn-
sylvania company.
206. In support of the premise that in-state political interests often motivate the passage of state
antitakeover legislation, see generally, Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA.
L. REV. 111 (1987).
207. Act of April 27, 1990 § 2587, supra note 5.
208. Business combination transactions include any merger, consolidation, sale, lease, exchange
or other disposition. Id. § 2586.
209. Id, § 2585(a).
210. Id. § 2585(b)(2).
211. Id. § 2585(b)(1).
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owned by the registered corporation after control-share approval. 212
Thus, the statute's provisions would still apply in the case of a substantial
restructuring of the corporation's operations as a result of fending off a
hostile takeover.
The Act preserves covered labor contracts until the contract termi-
nates by its provisions or until otherwise agreed by the parties to the
contract. 21 3 A covered labor contract includes any contract in effect cov-
ering persons employed in Pennsylvania relating to a business operation
owned by the corporation at the time of the control-share approval.
214
Standing alone, the provisions calling for the continuation of labor
contracts are clearly permissible as a legitimate state concern. The
troubling fact is that such provisions are included as part of the state's
antitakeover statute. Such provisions close the door on any renegotiation
of a covered labor contract, thus acting as one additional deterrent to
making a bid for a Pennsylvania company. By preventing the impair-
ment of any covered labor contract, the Act negates a major incentive for
entering into a takeover, namely increasing the operating efficiency of the
target company by reducing labor costs. By preventing any impairment
of a covered labor contract, the Act prevents a redeployment of corpo-
rate assets to their highest valued uses.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
The end of the 1980s seems to have brought a temporary slowdown
for the soaring takeover market, when mergers and acquisitions were fu-
eled by junk bonds and leveraged buyouts. 21 5 In fact, some commenta-
tors note that the market has made a self-correction (by a reduction in
available means of financing) for some of the perceived abuses in the
takeovers of the 1980s, just as state legislatures are increasing their legis-
lative efforts in the antitakeover field. 216 On the other hand, the market
for corporate control appears to have shifted into the hands of giant
worldwide companies snapping up their competitors in order to strategi-
cally enlarge their businesses. 21 7 Therefore, while no immediate chal-
lenge to Act 36 is on the horizon, such a challenge probably will surface
212. Id. § 2585(a).
213. Id. § 2587.
214. Id. § 2586.
215. Wall St. J., Dec. 4, 1990, at Cl.
216. Fin. Times, Oct. 18, 1990 at 34.
217. For example, in December 1990, American Telephone & Telegraph made a $6 billion unso-
licited bid for NCR Corp., only a week after Matsushita's $6.59 billion acquisition of MCA. Wall
St. J., Dec. 4, 1990, at Cl.
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in the not-too-distant future. This section analyzes what provisions, if
any, of Act 36 are likely to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
A. Supremacy Clause Analysis
In analyzing the Pennsylvania statute to determine whether it is pre-
empted by the Williams Act, one must reexamine the purposes and
mechanisms established in the Williams Act to regulate the conduct of
tender offers. As noted by Judge Easterbrook:
[t]he Williams Act regulates the process of tender offers: timing, disclo-
sure, proration if tenders exceed what the bidder is willing to buy, best-
price rules. It slows things down, allowing investors to evaluate the
offer and management's response .... After complying with the dis-
closure and delay requirements, the bidder is free to take the shares.218
Therefore, while Congress's primary goal in enacting the Williams Act
was providing investor protection, Congress sought to achieve this goal
by regulating the tender offer process, including disclosure, and not the
business merit of tender offers.
In Edgar v. MITE Corp. ,219 three Justices concluded that the Illinois
statute was preempted by the Williams Act because the statute impermis-
sibly attempted to regulate both the merit and the process of tender of-
fers, in contravention of the mandate of the Williams Act. Conversely, in
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,2 20  the Court concluded the
Indiana Act was not preempted by the Williams Act. The Indiana Act
gave a majority of the corporation's "disinterested shareholders" the
power to affirmatively grant or withhold voting rights to the shares
sought in a hostile tender offer-facially, a mere regulation of the process
of conducting a tender offer. The CTS Court found no inconsistency
between federal and state law because the Indiana Act allowed the bidder
to acquire shares without interference, even though the acquisition of
voting rights was conditioned on obtaining the majority approval of the
corporation's disinterested shareholders.2 21 Because nothing in the Indi-
ana Act purported to pass judgment on the merits of tender offers, the
CTS Court held the Indiana Act did not conflict with federal law.222
218. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 503 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989).
219. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
220. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
221. Amanda, 877 F.2d at 497.
222. The CTS Court adopted the following standard in order to determine whether a state's
antitakeover law impermissibly conflicts with the Williams Act's primary purpose of investor protec-
tion: does the state statute upset the delicate balance between incumbent management and bidders,
to the detriment of shareholders? CTS, 481 U.S. at 80-82. This standard was an adoption of the
MITE plurality opinion. Although the CTS Court was not required to adopt the MITE plurality
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The problem with the CTS preemption analysis is a failure to mean-
ingfully probe the effects of the state regulation at issue. When process
regulation becomes unduly burdensome, it leaves no tender offer process
for federal law to regulate. Clearly, the Indiana Act "makes tender offers
more risky and expensive .... [f]rom this, one can fairly assume some
chilling effect."' 223 Tender offers subject to control-share provisions like
the Indiana Act are made more risky and expensive by the "additional
expense of seeking a shareholder vote ... coupled with the risk that the
shareholders will fail to grant voting rights ... reduc[ing] the expected
value of a bid, which in turn lessens the likelihood that a bid ... will be
launched. ' 224 Thus, the effect of the Indiana Act completely chills the
tender offer process, which in turn robs shareholders of the right to make
a free decision. This impermissibly conflicts with the Williams Act's pri-
mary purpose of investor protection, by upsetting the delicate balance
between incumbent management and bidders, to the detriment of share-
holders. 225 Thus, a broader analysis of the Indiana Act would have con-
cluded that the state law impermissibly interfered with the policy of
investor choice mandated by federal disclosure law, and that the Indiana
Act was preempted by the Williams Act.
If the Indiana Act placed new obstacles in the path of hostile bids,
Pennsylvania's Act 36 will derail them entirely. In a systematic and
carefully crafted piece of legislation, Pennsylvania has set forth five pro-
visions designed to completely prohibit hostile tender offers for Penn-
sylvania corporations.
First, the fiduciary duty provisions of Act 36 allow the directors to
reject a hostile tender offer by concluding that stakeholder interests
predominate over the interests of the shareholders. 226 Assuming the bid-
der still has enough fortitude to proceed with a hostile bid, and the at-
tendant litigation, Act 36 requires any shares acquired in a control-share
acquisition to be subject to a majority vote of the corporation's disinter-
ested shareholders before obtaining voting rights.227 Requiring control-
share approval presents a formidable obstacle to a hostile takeover by
introducing additional expense and risk into the tender offer process. 228
opinion because it did not represent the views of the majority of the Court, the CTS Court adopted
what it felt was a "broad" reading of the Williams Act, concluding that the Indiana Act could
withstand a preemption challenge even upon such a broad interpretation. Id. at 81.
223. Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment on
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 HARV. L. REV. 96, 104 (1988).
224. Id. at n.47.
225. CTS, 481 U.S. at 80.
226. Act of April 27, 1990 § 511(d)(1), supra note 5.
227. Id. § 2563(a).
228. See supra notes 223-25 and accompanying text.
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Additional expense will be incurred by requiring the bidder to pay the
expenses of the special meeting required to decide the issue of according
voting rights to the control shares. These expenses may ultimately prove
to be quite significant. 229 Additional risk is introduced into the hostile
bid by making voting rights conditional on control-share approval.
230
Third, an additional significant risk awaits the hostile bidder in the
form of the Act's forced redemption provisions. If the bidder seeks con-
trol-share approval and fails, the target corporation can redeem the con-
trol-shares at the average of the high and low sale prices of the shares at
any time within twenty-four months of the denial of voting rights. 23 1 A
hostile bidder treads in dangerous waters if she seeks and fails to gain
control-share approval. Failure to obtain control-share approval will
permit the target corporation to wait for a significant decline in the tar-
get's stock price before redeeming the hostile bidder's shares at bargain
prices.
However, if the fiduciary duty provisions, the control-share provi-
sions and the forced redemption provisions are not enough to deter a
hostile bidder, the disgorgement provisions of Act 36 enter the picture,
by essentially acting as a penalty for anyone foolhardy enough to make a
hostile bid for a Pennsylvania company and fail. A typical scenario in
which these provisions might operate would be as follows. Even though
discouraged by incumbent management, who rejected a bid as contrary
to stakeholder interests, the bidder sought to consummate a deal by seek-
ing control-share approval. The shareholders, perhaps adopting manage-
ment's recommendation against the bid, deny control-share approval.
Can the hostile bidder cut her losses (incurred paying for the special
meeting of shareholders, the Williams Act requirements, the attorneys
and the accountants), by closing out her profitable position in the target
corporation? No, because the disgorgement provisions kick in and penal-
ize the hostile bidder for having the temerity to make a hostile bid for a
Pennsylvania corporation.
Finally, the continuation of labor contract provisions prevent the
reduction or renegotiation of a covered labor contract.232 The labor con-
229. To the extent that the special meeting expenses prove to be comparable to the expenses
required in the more traditional proxy contest, the magnitude of the expenses for the special meeting
will be quite substantial. For example, the Belzbergs' expenses in the Armstrong proxy contest were
$4.4 million. See supra note 11.
230. Since share control, per se, is not the goal of the corporate raider or greenmailer, providing
for control-share approval does little to discourage a greenmailer or raider.
231. Act of April 27, 1990 § 2566, supra note 5.
232. I have not included the severance compensation provisions of Act 36 in the discussion of
disincentives to a hostile bid. As discussed in note 206 and accompanying text, it appears that the
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tract provisions, if standing alone, would present no Supremacy Clause
problems. The troubling fact is that these provisions have been included
as part and parcel of the state's antitakeover law, as one additional deter-
rent to a hostile takeover. These provisions of Act 36 negate a major
incentive for entering into a corporate takeover,233 by forbidding a corpo-
rate realignment that would deploy a target corporation's assets in the
most efficient manner possible.
Thus, while nothing in Act 36 overtly regulates the merit of tender
offers, the heavy-handed nature of Pennsylvania's regulation of its cre-
ated corporations is so unduly burdensome that it leaves no process for
federal law to regulate. By making tender offers riskier and more expen-
sive, and by seeking to penalize those who would make a hostile offer for
a Pennsylvania corporation, Act 36 completely chills the tender offer
process. Because these provisions give management a decided advantage
in forestalling even good bids, Act 36 tips the scale in the favor of incum-
bent management, and thus conflicts with the Williams Act's primary
goal of investor protection. Act 36 should thus be preempted as imper-
missibly conflicting with the Williams Act.
B. Commerce Clause Analysis
The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have Power
* . . to regulate Commerce ... among the several States. '234 At least
since Cooley v. Board of Wardens235 in 1852, it has been settled that the
dormant Commerce Clause, by negative implication, limits the authority
of the states to enact legislation restricting the flow of interstate com-
merce, even absent congressional action.236
In analyzing the Pennsylvania statute to determine whether it vio-
lates the dormant Commerce Clause, one must remember the primary
purpose of the Commerce Clause. The primary reason the Commerce
Clause was included in the Constitution was to grant Congress power
over the national economy, in order to prevent the economic warfare
prevalent between the states under the Articles of Confederation. 237 As
severance compensation provisions are a political measure calculated to gain support from Penn-
sylvania workers, as identical protection is currently offered under federal law.
233. For example, a major incentive for Carl Icahn's takeover of TWA was that the carrier's
unions agreed to renegotiate covered labor contracts. These renegotiated labor contracts allowed
TWA to substantially lower its operating costs after Icahn acquired the company. Travel Weekly,
May 19, 1988.
234. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
235. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852).
236. CTS, 481 U.S. at 87.
237. See STONE, SEIDMAN, SUNSTEIN & TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (1986).
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noted by Justice White in CTS:
The few simple words of the Commerce Clause - 'The Congress shall
have Power... To regulate Commerce ... among the several States
. reflected a central concern of the Framers that was an immedi-
ate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the conviction
that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the ten-
dencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations
among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of
Confederation. 238
The MITE decision reflected this central concern of the Commerce
Clause, by concluding that the Illinois takeover statute at issue violated
the Commerce Clause in two ways. First, by attempting to directly regu-
late the interstate market for corporate control, the Illinois statute repre-
sented an attempt at extraterritorial legislation. Second, by engaging in a
balancing process, the MITE Court concluded that the purported bene-
fits of the statute were outweighed by the statute's substantial burden on
the interstate market for corporate control.
Conversely, the CTS Court concluded that nothing in the Indiana
Act discriminated against interstate commerce,239 and that the Act cre-
ated no risk of inconsistent regulation. 24° Finally, unlike the MITE
Court, the CTS Court declined to scrutinize the Indiana Act under the
general-purpose balancing test advocated in Pike v. Bruce Church Inc. 241
238. CTS, 481 U.S. at 100 (White, J., dissenting),(quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,
325-26 (1979)). See also, H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 537-538 (1949). "[The]
principle that our economic unit is the Nation, which alone has the gamut of powers necessary to
control the economy, including the vital power of erecting customs barriers against foreign competi-
tion, has as its corollary that the states are not separable economic units." Id.
239. CIS, 481 U.S. at 88. "Because nothing in the Act imposes a greater burden on out-of-state
offerors than it does on similarly situated in-state offerors, we reject the contention that the Act
discriminates against interstate commerce." Id. When analyzing a state statute to determine if the
effects are discriminatory, the Court has found that "[w]hen simple economic protectionism is ef-
fected by state legislation, a virtual per se rule of invalidity has been erected." Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
240. The Court concluded that the Indiana Act created no risk of inconsistent regulation, be-
cause unlike the Illinois statute at issue in MITE, the Indiana Act only applied to Indiana corpora-
tions. CTS, 481 U.S. at 89. See also Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959), in which the
Court struck down an Illinois statute specifying that contour mud guards be used on any trucks
operating in Illinois. Because the Illinois statute disallowed interstate trucking operations from us-
ing mud flaps that were legal in the majority of the other states, the Court held that the Illinois
regulation was a clear burden on interstate commerce. Id.
241. 342 U.S. 140 (1970). The majority opinion of the CTS Court never cited Pike. Further,
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion stated that the inquiry of the Pike balancing test is ill suited to the
judiciary and should be undertaken "rarely if at all." CIS, 481 U.S. at 95. Justice Scalia was reluc-
tant to engage in an ends balancing approach because he believes a task which balances the pur-
ported local benefits of a statute against the supposed burdens of the statute involves a fact-finding
function better suited to the legislature. Id. One commentator has proposed that in the area of
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, no matter what tests the Court has set forth (i.e., balanc-
ing), the Court has only been concerned (and properly so) with preventing the states from engaging
in purposeful economic protectionism. See Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:
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Instead, the CTS Court analyzed whether the purported goals of the In-
diana Act were rationally related to the Act's regulatory scheme. The
Court concluded that the Act's stated goals of investor protection and
protection for Indiana corporations were rationally related to the Act's
regulatory scheme providing for control-share approval.242 Thus, the
Court concluded that the Indiana Act did not violate the dormant Com-
merce Clause.
The main weakness in CTS's Commerce Clause analysis is a failure
to probe beyond the surface of the Indiana Act, both in terms of purpose
and the effect of the statute. The analysis is rather unimaginative as to
what type of discriminatory purpose might underlie the statute.243 One
such possible discriminatory purpose could have been to protect Indiana
businesses from the interstate market from corporate control.24 Fur-
ther, the CTS analysis fails to challenge whether the Indiana Act will
have a substantial negative impact on the national economy 245-just the
type of protectionist state legislation the Commerce Clause was intended
to prevent. 2
46
However, if the Court were to apply a more probing analysis in a
review of Pennsylvania's Act 36, such an analysis would reveal that
although Act 36 is facially neutral, 247 it represents an effort to favor in-
state interests at the expense of national economic growth through opti-
mal allocation of assets, which Congress sought to encourage via Wil-
liams Act neutrality. Act 36 represents an effort to favor in-state
interests because, like other third-generation antitakeover legislation, it
Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1092 (1986). Similarly,
Professor Eule rejects an ends balancing approach for scrutinizing state commercial enactments, by
offering a model for judicial scrutiny calculated to preserve the democratic process. See, Eule, Lay-
ing the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L. J. 425, 427-28 (1982).
242. CTS, 481 U.S. at 89-94.
243. Several commentators have severely criticized the CIS decision for its failure to seriously
challenge the Indiana Act's stated purpose of shareholder protection. See Langevoort, supra note
223, at 117-18:
By accepting Indiana's ostensible purpose, notwithstanding serious grounds for doubt, the
Court simply ratified the charade of shareholder protection. The unfortunate legacy of
C7S thus will be to make the same charade de rigueur for all future takeover laws, encour-
aging a false characterization that only serves to hide the difficult problems of takeover
regulation from public debate.
Id. See also, Regan, supra note 135.
244. See Langevoort, supra note 223, at 107.
245. Antitakeover legislation can work a substantial negative impact on the national economy by
preventing an optimal allocation of corporate assets throughout the national economy, irrespective
of state borders.
246. H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1949). "The principle that our
economic unit is the Nation, . . . has as its corollary that the states are not separable economic
units." Id.
247. Act 36 is facially neutral because it applies with equal force to anyone making a hostile bid
for a Pennsylvania company. The statute provides no exemptions for Pennsylvania residents.
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has clearly been aimed at protecting in-state stakeholder interests. 248
The "benefit" provided by Act 36 is nothing more than protection for
Pennsylvania stakeholder interests such as Pennsylvania workers, the en-
acting state, and in-state corporations under siege from a hostile tender
offer.
Pennsylvania's Act 36 was enacted to provide protection for Arm-
strong World Industries, cowering under the threat of a hostile bid from
the Belzbergs. In fact, in support of antitakeover legislation like Act 36,
Pennsylvania's Attorney General Ernie Preate said, "Pennsylvania has
the right to protect the future of its communities against exploitation by
speculators. ' 249 But, Pennsylvania does not have the right to close its
borders to the flow of interstate commerce. The motivation of protecting
local interests "flies in the face of a core commerce clause value: avoiding
local protectionism with respect to the interstate movement of economic
resources." 2
50
However, Act 36 is "outwardly cloaked 'in the currently fashionable
garb'.. ."251 of shareholder protection, which protected the Indiana Act
in CTS. While Act 36 is carefully crafted to apply equally to both Penn-
sylvania bidders and out-of-state bidders, no one can seriously contend
that Pennsylvania will be forced to accept any significant negative eco-
nomic costs by forbidding Pennsylvania bidders to forego hostile bids for
Pennsylvania companies. In Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal
Foods Corp.,252 Judge Easterbrook concluded that Wisconsin's antitake-
over statute did not discriminate against interstate commerce because the
statute equally discouraged both in-state and out-of-state tender offers. 253
Judge Easterbrook correctly observed that "[d]oubtless most bidders...
248. The stakeholder interests served by state antitakeover legislation include the enacting state
as well as in-state target corporations under siege from a hostile tender offer. Professor Booth notes
that the true motivation behind antitakeover legislation may be prospects of gains to be realized by
the enacting state (for example, by retaining the state and local tax base). Booth, supra note 112, at
1668-69. See also Steinberg, supra note 45, at 83-85. Steinberg notes that a large number of third-
generation antitakeover legislation was enacted by state legislatures under pressure from home-based
companies under siege from hostile tender offers. Id. For example, the following states enacted
antitakeover legislation at the behest of the following large private employers: Minnesota - Dayton
Hudson; Arizona - Greyhound; North Carolina - Burlington Northern; Massachusetts - Gillette;
and Washington - Boeing. Id. Even Professor Coffee admits that a persuasive argument can be
made that the "benefit" provided by antitakeover legislation is no more than thinly-disguised protec-
tionism designed to protect in-state stakeholder interests. Coffee, supra note 8, at 100.
249. 21 SEC. REG. LAW RPT. 1223 (1989). In a similar vein, Governor Dukakis's recent signing
of Massachusetts's new antitakeover bill took place on the steps of the Gillette factory. Steinberg,
supra note 45, at 85.
250. Langevoort, supra note 223, at 107.
251. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 625-26 (1978).
252. 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989).
253. Id. at 505.
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are located outside Wisconsin. '2 54 He missed the point however, when
he concluded that ". . . unless the law discriminates according to resi-
dence alone [the fact that most bidders are located outside Wisconsin]
does not matter. ' 255 In the past, the Supreme Court has not failed to
look beyond facially neutral statutes to determine if the harmful effects of
such statutes are disproportionately visited upon out-of-state actors.
256
Thus, a legitimate claim can be made that Act 36 represents Penn-
sylvania's protectionist attempt to prevent an unrestricted market for
corporate control from operating within Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania
cannot be permitted to block the flow of interstate commerce at its bor-
der. Applying the rule of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, when "simple eco-
nomic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule
of invalidity has been erected. ' 257 Thus, Act 36 violates the Commerce
Clause as purposeful economic protectionism.
In addition, Act 36 represents a statute whose harmful effects are
disproportionately shouldered by out-of-staters. Protectionist legislation
like Act 36 "is inefficient because it diverts business away from presump-
tively low-cost producers without any colorable justification in terms of a
benefit that deserves approval from the point of view of the nation as a
whole. ' 258 Act 36 will injure the national economy 259 by precluding hos-
tile takeovers that would otherwise serve national economic interests, by
optimally allocating corporate assets, irrespective of state borders.
Again, Act 36 is carefully crafted to apply equally to both Penn-
sylvania and out-of-state hostile bidders. Pennsylvania, however, re-
ceives all the "benefits" of Act 36-protection of Pennsylvania workers,
Pennsylvania corporations, and Pennsylvania's state and local tax base.
The rest of the nation bears the costs of Act 36-the prevention of a free
flow of the nation's economic resources to their highest and most efficient
use.
2 6 0
254. Id. at 506.
255. Id.
256. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Com'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
257. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624.
258. Regan, supra note 241, at 1118.
259. In Amanda, Judge Easterbrook recognized that state antitakeover legislation injures the
economy, by preventing premium hostile bids which reflect the better use to which the bidder can
put the target company's assets. Amanda, 877 F.2d at 500. Professor Langevoort maintains that
no one seriously can deny that [hostile bids] are of some (if indeterminate) value to the national
economy." Langevoort, supra note 223, at 116.
260. Concluding that Pennsylvania could be forced to accept some costs present in a hostile
takeover, Pennsylvania responds by erecting such large barriers as to preclude a bidder from even
seriously entertaining thoughts of making a hostile bid for a Pennsylvania company. See supra notes
223-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ways in which Act 36 operates as a formidable
barrier to the successful completion of a hostile tender offer.
[Vol. 66:863900
REGULATION OF INTERSTATE MARKET
Thus, Act 36 clearly represents a statute whose harmful effects are
disproportionately visited upon out-of-state interests. Applying the rule
of Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,261 when a
statute is facially neutral, but with a disproportionate harmful effect on
out-of-staters, the Court has not hesitated to find that the statute violates
the Commerce Clause. The disproportionate harmful effects of Act 36
unduly burden the interstate market for corporate control. Accordingly,
Pennsylvania's Act 36 should be struck down as an impermissible regula-
tion of the interstate market for corporate control.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note has examined the policy arguments for and against state
antitakeover legislation, concluding state antitakeover legislation should
not be allowed to restrict the free flow of corporate assets to their highest
valued use within the entire national economy.
Pennsylvania's Act 36 should be preempted as a result of the Wil-
liams Act. Applying the reasoning of the Supreme Court in CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America, none of the provisions of Act 36 facially
conflict with the Williams Act. However, a broader analysis shows that
the heavy-handed nature of Act 36 is so unduly burdensome on bidders
that it upsets the delicate balance between incumbent management and
the bidder, to the detriment of the investor. For this reason, Act 36 im-
permissibly conflicts with the Williams Act's primary goal of investor
protection, and thus, should be preempted.
Moreover, because Act 36 embodies the type of purposeful eco-
nomic protectionism which the Commerce Clause was intended to pre-
vent and because the effect of Act 36 is to unduly burden the national
economy, Act 36 should be struck down as a impermissible restraint of
interstate commerce. Since both the purpose and the effect of Act 36 is
to prevent the free flow of corporate assets within the national economy,
the statute is an impermissible regulation of the interstate market for cor-
porate control.
261. 432 U.S. 333 (1977). Hunt declared a North Carolina law requiring closed cartons of ap-
ples shipped into North Carolina to bear only the USDA grading label unconstitutional as an undue
burden on interstate commerce. Id. While the North Carolina law was facially neutral, the Court
found the law's effect to be discriminatory, because unlike other states, North Carolina had no sepa-
rate state grading system. Thus, the North Carolina law imposed burdens on out-of-staters (princi-
pally Washington state) that were not imposed on in-staters. Id. at 351-54. Similarly, in South
Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938), Justice Stone, speak-
ing for the Court said:
".... when the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon those
without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to political restraints which
are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the
state."
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